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TOWARDS A PROCEDURAL IUS COMMUNE? 
 
C.H. van Rhee, Maastricht University1 
 
 
Introduction 
During the last decade or so, the question whether or not European legal systems are converging 
has been debated fiercely. According to the main proponent of the anti-convergence argument, 
Pierre Legrand, no convergence is taking place. This author holds that differences in legal culture 
prevent the various national systems from growing together despite the introduction of similar 
rules of law in the different member states of the European Union.2 Other authors, on the 
contrary, are convinced that approximation of the national systems of law is taking place.3 Some 
of these authors also believe that the creation of a harmonised set of legal rules for the European 
Union is a feasible option. This conviction is shown strikingly in the second edition of Towards 
a European Civil Code edited by A.S. Hartkamp and others.4 Unlike the first edition of this 
book, the considerably revised second edition takes the feasibility of a European ius commune 
for granted; it directly addresses the possible content of harmonised European rules.5 
 On an earlier occasion,6 I have expressed the opinion that I tend to agree with the authors 
who favour the convergence argument. Although one might concur with Legrand that common 
rules of law do not necessarily guarantee their uniform interpretation and application, it cannot 
be denied that the introduction of similar rules nevertheless brings legal systems somehow closer 
together than they were before. Additionally, the existence of similar rules may trigger their 
uniform interpretation, at least to some extent, in situations where information on their 
interpretation and application in one or more jurisdictions is readily available to courts and 
practitioners. An example of such a situation may be found in the Netherlands at the time of the 
introduction of the 1838 Code of Civil Procedure: not only was this Code to a large extent 
modelled on the French Code de procédure civile, so, too were French treatises on civil 
procedure, which were apparently widely available and cited frequently in the first decades of the 
Code’s existence.7 
 The above example is a special case in the sense that it deals with an area of the law 
which for a long time has been considered to be immune from foreign influences and, therefore, 
from anything but the most incidental and haphazard converging tendency (mistakenly so, as the 
example shows). In support of the thesis that civil procedure is a purely national branch of the 
                                                             
1. The author would like to thank Professor W. de Vos (Stellenbosch) for correcting the English of an earlier 
version of this paper. 
2. E.g. P. Legrand, European Legal Systems are not Converging, International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1996), 
52ff; Idem, On the Unbearable Localness of the Law: Academic Fallacies and Unseasonable Observations, European 
Review of Private Law (2002), 61ff. 
3. E.g. H.P. Glenn, La civilisation de la ‘common law’, Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé (1993), 567; B.S. 
Markesinis, Learning from Europe and Learning in Europe, in: B.S. Markesinis (ed.), The Gradual Convergence: Foreign 
Ideas, Foreign Influences, and English Law on the Eve of the 21st Century, Oxford 1994, 30; A. Watson, Legal 
Transplants and European Private Law (Ius Commune Lectures on European Private Law 2), Maastricht 2000. 
4. First edition Nijmegen 1994; second edition Nijmegen 1998. 
5. Cf. the prefaces to the first and the second editions. 
6. See my ‘Civil Procedure: a European Ius Commune?’, European Review of Private Law (2000), 589ff. 
7. French textbooks are, for example, frequently cited by A. Oudeman, Het Nederlandsch Wetboek van burgerlijke 
regtsvordering, naar deszelfs beginselen ontwikkeld en door formulieren in praktijk gebragt , 4 vols., Groningen 1842-
1845; A. de Pinto, Handleiding tot het Wetboek van burgerlijke regtsvordering, 2 vols., ‘s-Gravenhage 1845. 
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law, it has been claimed that procedure is very much linked to court organisation, an area of the 
law which is traditionally considered to be the exclusive domain of the national legislature. 
Additionally, it is held that the way in which litigation is conducted is closely linked to national 
convictions and traditions. It seems, however, that these ideas are subject to erosion. After all, the 
new Article 65 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community lays down that ‘Measures in 
the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross border implications, to be taken in 
accordance with Article 67 and insofar as necessary for the proper functioning of the internal 
market, shall include: […] c) eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceedings, 
if necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the 
Member States.’ Even before the introduction of this Article, however, international attempts to 
harmonise procedural legislation had already been made. Of course, the report of the Storme 
Working Group immediately comes to mind as regards harmonisation of procedural law within 
the European Union.8 Currently, further attempts are being made on an even wider international 
level under the aegis of the American Law Institute and Unidroit.9 
 The present article seeks to question the anti-convergence argument from the perspective 
of legal history. It gives a brief overview of the shared legal past of most modern systems of civil 
procedure in Europe and tries to identify areas of procedural law which have been susceptible to 
convergence, areas of the law which in my opinion merit further investigation. The main focus of 
attention will be on the influence of continental civil procedure on its English counterpart. Before 
addressing this theme, however, something needs to be said about the terminology ius commune 
which I use in this article as well as about the reception of the Romano-canonical procedure in 
secular courts. 
 
1 Ius Commune  
Today, ius commune is often used to denote a common law of Europe, i.e. a set of rules shared 
by the various member states of the European Union. In that sense, ius commune is to a large 
extent something of the future, a goal to be achieved. In the past, however, this was not the case. 
At that time ius commune was in many instances not used to refer to a common set of legal rules. 
As P. Nève has shown,10 the historical terminology ius commune had many different meanings. 
Usually, it could best be defined as a common legal science (doctrine),11 mainly based on Roman 
Law (Corpus Iuris Civilis) and Canon Law (Corpus Iuris Canonici). In the field of procedure, 
however, the situation might have been different. In order to make this clear, we need to have a 
look at the early history of the modern systems of procedural law. 
 As we all know, the ‘mother’ of most modern systems of civil procedure on the European 
Continent is the so-called Romano-canonical procedure, which came into existence in the 12th 
century. It was developed on the basis of materials derived from the Corpus Iuris Civilis as well 
as from some other sources, for example those belonging to Canon Law.12 According to Nève,13 
unlike substantive private law, procedure consisted from the outset of a blend of Roman and 
Canon Laws. It could therefore rightly be considered to be a ius commune, not in the traditional 
sense, but in the sense of a single system of procedural law built from elements of the two 
learned laws. 
                                                             
8. M. Storme (ed.), Approximation of Judiciary Law in the European Union, Dordrecht etc. 1994. 
9. Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure at http://www.ali.org/ali/transrules.htm. 
10. P.L. Nève, Ius Commune oftewel ‘gemeen recht’: traduttore traditore?, in: Tertium datur: Drie opstellen aangeboden 
aan Prof. mr. J.A. Ankum, Tilburg 1995, 3-58. See also idem, (Europäisches) Ius Commune und (nationales) gemeines 
Recht: Verwechslung von Begriffen?, in: G. Köbler, H. Nehlzen (eds.), Wirkungen europaïscher Rechtskultur, Festschrift 
für Karl Kroeschell zum 70. Geburtstag, Munich 1997, 871ff. 
11. Also R. Schulze, Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze und europäisches Privatrecht, Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 
(1993), 442. 
12. See e.g. R.C. van Caenegem, History of European Civil Procedure, in: International Encyclopedia of Comparative 
Law XVI, Tübingen/Paris/New York n.d., Chapter 2, 16. 
13. Nève, Ius Commune, 20-21. 
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 Quickly, the new procedure became a separate field of study, something which appears 
from the considerable body of contemporary literature solely dealing with procedural topics.14 
This was a new development, since procedure was not treated as a separate subject in the Corpus 
Iuris Civilis. There, rules concerning procedure (often rules of the procedure extra ordinem from 
the time of Justinian) were not grouped together and, consequently, it was the task of the early 
students of Roman Law to bring the scattered procedural rules from the Corpus Iuris together. 
 The new procedure was applied by a new type of ecclesiastical courts known as 
officialities. These officialities were spread all over Europe and dealt with a wide range of issues. 
As a result, the Romano-canonical procedure became known in the greater part of the medieval 
Christian world. 
 As regards the particular way in which the Romano-canonical procedure was applied at 
the ecclesiastical courts, final conclusions cannot be drawn at the present stage of research. The 
available evidence suggests, however, that it was not applied in an identical manner (something 
that would, indeed, have been surprising in the light of the local differences that exist even today 
in a single codified legal system); variations can be observed.15 As regards the ecclesiastical 
courts in England, for example, R.H. Helmholz states: ‘It would be fair to say that the procedure 
used in the English spiritual courts always followed the outlines of that found in contemporary 
ordines and other procedural manuals, but that it often did so in simplified fashion.’ These 
varations may prevent us from referring to the Romano-canonical procedure as a ius commune in 
the sense of a common procedural law for the ecclesiastical courts in Europe. However, after 
listing the differences between the law on the books and the rules of procedure actually applied 
in the spiritual courts, professor Helmholz also remarks that ‘[t]hese, and other such features, 
seem to have been permissible variants of Romano-canonical procedure. Not all were features 
one could read about directly in the medieval handbooks. But neither were they contrary to the 
canon law.’16 Whether one can refer to the Romano-canonical procedure as ius commune in the 
sense of a common European law of procedure is, therefore, to a large extent a matter of personal 
preference. In the present article I opt for using the terminology ius commune in referring to the 
learned Romano-canonical procedure. One should, however, be aware of the limitations of this 
terminology. 
 
2 The reception of the procedural ius commune in secular courts 
 
2.1 Reception on the Continent 
The introduction of a learned procedure in the domain of the secular courts of the European 
Continent17 was the result of different factors (which can only be discussed here in part). One of 
them was that clerics regularly acted as judges in superior lay courts. Apart from a thorough 
knowledge of substantive Roman and Canon Law, they were usually acquainted with the 
Romano-canonical procedure. These lawyers often had recourse to the ius commune when it was 
possible and necessary to supplement and modify the rules of procedure of the secular courts to 
which they were attached. Additionally, European rulers introduced Romano-canonical rules 
when they made attempts to modernise and centralise the administration of justice in their realm, 
                                                             
14. On the early procedural literature, see L. Fowler-Magerl, Ordo iudiciorum vel ordo iudiciarius, Frankfurt a. M. 
1984; W. Litewski, Der römisch-kanonische Zivilprozess nach den älteren ordines iudiciarii, 2 vols., Kraków1999. 
15. Also R.C. van Caenegem, European Law in the Past and the Future. Unity and Diversity over Two 
Millennia, Cambridge 2002, 20. 
16. R.H. Helmholz, The Universal and the Particular in Medieval Canon Law, in: P. Landau, J. Mueller (eds.), 
Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law (Monumenta Iuris Canonici, Series C: 
Subsidia, Vol. 10), Vatican City 1997, 653. 
17. When mentioning continental Europe, one should not forget that Scotland, at least from the 16th century, also 
belonged to the continental tradition. The supreme civil court in Scotland, established as a ‘college of justice’ in May 
1532, for example, used a procedure that had a distinct Romano-canonical outlook. See J. Finlay, Men of Law in pre-
reformation Scotland (Scottish historical review monograph 9), East Lothian 2000, esp. Chapter 5. 
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i.e. when they deliberately introduced new rules of process. This was to some extent the result of 
the apparent superiority of the new procedure as compared with indigenous legal practice. Trial 
by battle and ordeals, for example, was a common feature of the old procedure. These methods 
lost their appeal in the quickly changing late medieval society. This society needed a new, 
rational procedure for which the Romano-canonical procedure was able to provide the model. 
 The reception of Romano-canonical rules of procedure did not result in a uniform 
procedure on the European Continent. As stated above, even at the level of the ecclesiastical 
courts, procedure showed local differences. Such differences were even more likely within the 
atmosphere of the secular courts since these courts were not subject to a single Pope and a single 
Canon Law, but to different princes and different regional customs. The differences that may be 
observed in the various procedures of the secular courts in Europe are so numerous, that it is 
wrong in my opinion to use the terminology ius commune in order to refer to these procedures. 
Nevertheless, marked similarities did exist. I will mention just a few examples.  
 First, the Romano-canonical model gave rise to procedures that were mainly written. 
These procedures relied heavily on documents; all steps in a lawsuit had to be recorded. This was 
in sharp contrast to indigenous legal practice, where the oral element was preponderant. As a 
result of the reception of the Romano-canonical forms of process, the oral element in the 
procedures of continental Europe became less important and nearly disappeared in some 
places.18 Secondly, the Romano-canonical procedure furnished European lawyers with a 
procedural terminology and concepts that were, at least to a certain extent, standarised. All 
European lawyers were (and are) familiar with terms such as citatio, exceptio or litis 
contestatio.19 This, of course, facilitated the international legal debate. Finally, the influence of 
the Romano-canonical model resulted in particular procedural rules to be the same in some or all 
continental European states. A notable example of a shared rule on the European Continent was 
that a single witness did not suffice for full proof. The availability of counterclaims is another.20 
 
2.2 Reception in England 
The reception of the Romano-canonical procedure in English lay courts was less successful than 
on the European Continent. This was due to the fact that at the time of the initial reception of the 
learned laws on the Continent, i.e. in the 12th century, in England the ‘common law emerged 
[…] from the efficient and rapid expansion of institutions which existed in an undeveloped form 
before 1066.’21 This common law may rightly be called a ius commune for England in the sense 
of a system of rules common to the whole realm. While other European ‘nations’ turned to 
Roman Law for modernisation of the law, England developed its own legal system. 22 This 
system was sufficiently modern to meet the demands of the time. Therefore, Roman Law did not 
gain as much ground there as on the Continent. The same was true for the Romano-canonical 
procedure. The exclusion of this procedure was reinforced by the fact that under the common 
law, procedure and substantive law were interrelated subjects. Forms of action dominated the 
scene and the particular procedural rules to be followed were determined by the available writ.23 
                                                             
18. Van Caenegem, History, 12. 
19. For the Romano-canonical variant of procedure applied at one of the supreme courts of the Low Countries, the Great 
Council of Malines, see my Litigation and Legislation. Civil Procedure at First Instance in the Great Council for the 
Netherlands in Malines (1522-1559), Brussels 1997. 
20. It should be noted, however, that, although counterclaims were (and are) allowed in most continental jurisdictions, a 
difference of opinion existed (and still exists) regarding whether or not a counterclaim needs to be related to the original 
claim. This subject is discussed in my ‘De vordering in reconventie in Nederland en Europa’, in: E.H. Hondius e.a. (eds.), 
Liber Amicorum Paul Meijknecht . Van Nederlands naar Europees Procesrecht?!, Deventer 2000, 227ff. 
21. J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 3rd edition, London etc. 1990, 14. 
22. Van Caenegem, History, 15. 
23. F.W. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law: A Course of Lectures, Cambridge 1968 (reprint), 2: ‘The 
choice [between forms of action] is not merely a choice between a number of queer technical terms, it is a choice between 
methods of procedure adapted  to cases of different kinds.’ 
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 However, even though the common law furnished England with its own substantive and 
procedural law, this did not mean that English and continental systems of procedure lacked 
common features. On the contrary, similarities did exist. Some of these similarities might have 
been remnants of older forms of process which were incorporated in the Romano-canonical 
procedures of the Continent and the common law forms of action. An example are the so-called 
‘essoins’.24 Both according to the medieval common law25 and according to procedure on the 
Continent,26 a litigant who failed to appear in court was allowed to send excuses by so-called 
‘essoiners’ which in French procedural language and in English Law French were called 
‘essoins.’ The messengers, known as ‘essoiners’, could excuse the defaulter from being absent 
by explaining that he was sick, abroad, on the King’s service, cut off by a flood, a broken bridge, 
and so forth. ‘Essoins’ secured delays of varying length. 
 The observance of (aspects of) the rule audite et alteram partem, i.e. the rule that both 
parties should be given equal opportunities to be heard by the court, may also be an example of 
continuity in European civil procedure finding its origin in the period from before the 
introduction of the new systems of procedural law in England and on the Continent.27 This rule 
dominated (and still dominates) procedure both in common law and civil law jurisdictions. 
Observance of the rule appears where courts go to particular lengths to make the parties appear 
before them. 28 Defendants need to be summoned. If they do not make their appearance in court, 
proceedings are postponed. After appearance, the litigants have the opportunity to respond to the 
allegations of their opponents. Although differences may be observed in this area of the law,29 
the basic rule is the same everywhere. 
 Apart from the above similarities, further similarities came into being as a result of the 
fact that the ius commune influenced English procedure in various ways. A channel through 
which English law was influenced by Roman and Canon Law at an early stage was equity. 
Equity aimed at mending defects of the common law. J.H. Baker mentions the example of the 
debtor who gave his creditor a sealed bond, but did not ensure that it was cancelled when he paid 
up. The common law regarded the bond as incontrovertible evidence of the debt, and so payment 
was no defence. In such situations, petitions for relief were presented to the English King. The 
King had these petitions decided by his Chancellor, not according to the rules of common law 
but on the basis of equity and justice. Slowly, this gave rise to a new jurisdiction which became 
known as equity.30  
At an early stage most Chancellors were clerics and, therefore, acquainted with Roman 
and Canon Law as well as with the Romano-canonical procedure. It is not surprising that they, 
just as their colleagues at the secular courts on the European Continent, made use of this 
knowledge and, as a result, the body of law which became known as equity shows marked 
influences of the the learned law.31 Even professor J.H. Baker, who in his Introduction to English 
                                                             
24. Van Caenegem, History, 9. 
25. T.F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (5th ed.), Boston 1956, 384. 
26. For France, see A. Tardif, La procédure civile et criminelle aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles ou procédure de transition, Paris 
1885 (reprint Aalen 1974), 55-56. For the Low Countries, see Ph. Wielant, Practijke Civile, Antwerp 1573 (reprint 
Amsterdam 1968), 89-91. 
27. On the history of this rule from Roman times, see L. Coenraad, Het beginsel van hoor en wederhoor in het 
Romeinse procesrecht, Rotterdam 2000. 
28. For common law jurisdictions, see Plucknett, A Concise History, 385. 
29. In common law jurisdictions, for example, it is usually the plaintiff who has the last word, whereas on the Continent 
the last word is traditionally reserved for the defendant. 
30. See e.g. A. Reppy, The Field Codification Concept, in: A. Reppy (ed.), David Dudley Field Centenary Essays. 
Celebrating One Hundred Years of Legal Reform , New York 1949, 21ff. 
31. Van Caenegem, History, 45: ‘The special nature of the chancellor’s intervention and the fact that he was a cleric and 
surrounded by a staff of clerics led to the adoption of a procedure that was very different from that of the Common Law 
and very close to the Romano-canonical procedure, especially in the summary form of the decretal Saepe, which had been 
issued in the early fourteenth century.’ See also R.W. Millar (ed.), A History of Continental Civil Procedure, London 
1928, 19-20, who calls chancery procedure ‘the joint product of canon and common law’; D.S. Clark, The Civil Law 
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Legal History is generally rather sceptical as regards the influences of the learned law on English 
law, states: ‘The procedure [of the Court of Chancery] clearly owed something to the 
inquisitorial32 procedure of the canonists.’33 This is, however, not to say that only equity was 
influenced by the ius commune and that the common law remained immune from these 
influences. An example of civilian influences on the common law in the early-modern period can 
be found in the area of proof (a subject which, at least from a continental perspective, clearly 
belongs to the domain of procedural law). 
In his excellent book on The Law of Proof in Early Modern Equity,34 Michael Macnair 
explains that, in the period discussed by him, the common law should be viewed as local 
positive law, within the general hierarchy of laws accepted in later medieval and early modern 
thought (the hierarchy being divine law, natural law, the law of nations and positive law). 
Within this framework, he claims, the basic ideas of the law of proof were considered to be of 
divine law, since they could be supported from the Bible. As such they were binding on all 
tribunals. Divine law as a source was later replaced by more general natural law concepts 
drawn from the universal usages of nations. A substantial part of these concepts was to be 
found in the civilian and theological literature and did directly influence the common law of 
proof. According to the learned author, this may have been due partly to the fact that courts of 
equity sought to offer relief from the defects of the common law. Some of these defects were 
to be found in the existing rules of proof at common law (for example those concerning 
common law estoppels and the absence of compulsion of witnesses). By reforming their proof 
rules, common law lawyers could prevent the intervention of equity courts and consequently 
increase their business. 
The question whether or not, in adapting the common law, English common law 
lawyers consulted civilian and theological sources themselves has often been answered 
negatively. It has been suggested that these lawyers copied ‘civilian’ concepts of proof from 
equity. Equity might indeed have been the origin of these concepts at common law since, 
according to Dr. Macnair, there are at least three reasons to suppose that equity proof was a 
system which applied the general principles of the Roman-Canon Law of proof (although the 
author also claims that the rules of proof in equity were certainly not equivalent to those of 
the Roman-Canon Law). The author states: ‘The first [of these reasons] is parallelism of 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Influence on David Dudley Field’s Code of Civil Procedure, in: The Reception of Continental Ideas in the Common Law 
World (1820-1920), Berlin 1993, 69 (‘the common Romano-canonical influences on ... chancery ... procedure’); ibidem, 
75-76 (‘Equity courts ... were viewed as Romano-canonical’). 
32. Even though it must be admitted that the Romano-canonical procedure can be described as inquisitorial in certain 
respects, describing this procedure as ‘inquisitorial’ tout court is in my opinion overstating the case. The same is true 
for modern systems of civil procedure on the European Continent, which, however, incidentially are also described as 
inquisitorial by some Anglo-American lawyers. Indeed, before the introduction of the recent reforms in English civil 
procedure, the powers of the English judge were rather limited (they still are for today’s American judge). A 
comparison of his position with that of his continental counterpart inevitably leads to the conclusion that continental 
systems are less adversarial. Nevertheless, some kind of  party autonomy has always been a feature of both modern 
continental systems of civil procedure and of the Romano-canonical procedure. Therefore, calling these procedures 
‘inquisitorial’ in the sense of completely judge-driven gives, I respectfully submit, the wrong impression. J.M.J. 
Chorus agrees with this point of view, at least as regards modern continental systems of civil procedure. See his ‘The 
Judge’s Role in the Conduct of Civil Proceedings’, in: D.L. Carey Miller, D.W. Meyers (eds.), Comparative and 
Historical Essays in Scots Law, Edinburgh 1992, 32ff. See also idem, Civilian Elements in European Civil Procedure, 
in: D.L. Carey Miller, R. Zimmermann (eds.), The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law. Aberdeen Quincentenary Essays, 
Berlin 1997, 299: ‘At the outset we must forget this inquisitorial label. It is an unfortunate label because to lawyers of 
today it no longer refers to the great traditions of continental Romano-canonical procedure and, indeed, those of the 
old Court of Chancery and the Court of Session of the 17th and 18th centuries, which might, with greater justification, 
be styled inquisitorial (with a positive connotation).’ 
33. Baker, An Introduction, 119. On the history of the Court of Chancery, see the introduction to D.C.C. Yale (ed.), 
Lord Nottingham’s Chancery Cases (Selden Soc. Publ. 79), London 1961, 7-207. 
34. Berlin 1999. 
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content; the second linguistic echoes; and the third instances of direct citation.’35 There are 
various situations in which rules indeed might have been copied by common law lawyers 
from equity (for example rules concerning ‘discovery’ and subpoenas ad testificandum). 
However, in other areas the sources for equity proof doctrine largely begin at the same period 
as the first steps in common law evidence doctrine (e.g. documentary originals, exceptions to 
witnesses) and, as a result, equity could not have been a source. According to Dr. Macnair, in 
the latter areas there is direct or near-direct evidence of common law lawyers referring 
directly to civilian sources on proof matters.36 
Consequently, it can be stated that the law of proof was in its own time a convergence 
(albeit not a complete one) between the common and the civil laws. True, later developments 
(mainly the abolition of the old law of proof in continental Europe at the end of the 18th 
century) resulted in continental law and English law, after a period of convergence, growing 
apart again in this particular area of the law. But, the point I would like to stress here is that 
even the common law of proof did not flourish in ‘noble isolation’37 from the learned law. As 
will be shown hereafter, more examples in the area of procedure can be mentioned, examples 
that sometimes have resulted in lasting similarities between England and the Continent. These 
date mainly from the 19th century, and it is on this period that I would like to focus attention 
now. 
 
3 Codification of procedure  
The 19th century was the age of codification. It witnessed the birth of various codes, including 
Codes of Civil Procedure. Although the codification movement was very successful on the 
European Continent, it did not gain ground in England, the country of Jeremy Bentham who 
seems to have coined the term ‘codification.’ However, even in 19th century England, the 
legislature was active in the field of procedure. England gave birth to some very important 
statutes regarding judicial organisation and procedure. The most important Acts date from 1873 
and 1875 and are known as the Judicature Acts. These Acts resulted in a streamlined court 
system. Courts of common law and equity were fused and the forms of action were abolished. 
The Judicature Acts provided a uniform ‘code’ of civil procedure and pleading.38 
 On the Continent, the law, including procedure, lost some of its European appearance as 
a result of the activities of the national legislatures. However, similarities continued to exist in 
the juridical landscape. Most codifications did not break with tradition. The codification of 
judiciary law was based on Romano-canonical models. In France, for example, the ordinance on 
procedure of 1667,39 which combined Romano-canonical and indigenous elements, formed the 
basis of the Code of Civil Procedure (1806). In Germany the Zivilprozessordnung (1877) had a 
distinctly Romano-canonical flavour even though it contained important innovations.40 
 Similarities on the European scene were caused not just by the Romano-canonical 
background of many codified rules. Additionally, the influence of some of the procedural codes 
and ideas in other countries resulted in a similarity of different national procedures. The French 
Code de Procédure Civile of 1806 was very influential. The Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, Spain and Switzerland were all influenced by this code.41 In Holland and Belgium the 
French Code of Civil Procedure continued to apply after the defeat of the French emperor. In 
                                                             
35. See p. 289. 
36. See p. 38. 
37. Baker, An Introduction, 35. 
38. W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law XV, (4th ed.) London 1994, 128. 
39. Ordonnance civile pour la réformation de la justice of Louis XIV (also known as Code Louis). 
40. I do not agree with P.H. Lindblom, who states: ‘In Germany, there seems to be no reason to characterise the 
national procedural law as a version of the procedural law of ius commune’ (Harmony of the Legal Spheres: A 
Swedish view on the construction of a unified European procedural law, European Review of Private Law 1997, 18). 
41. Van Caenegem, History, 91. 
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Belgium it remained in force for more than 150 years until the introduction of the new 1967 
Code. Although the Netherlands only left the French code in force until 1838, the new Dutch 
code nevertheless leaned heavily on the French example; many of the rules it originally 
contained were a direct translation from the provisions of the French code. In the more recent 
past, Austrian-German procedure has been very influential, for example in France and Italy.42 
 Although the activities of the national legislatures might have caused continental 
procedure to lose some of its European appearance, the opposite is true for the English Judicature 
Acts. In England, the new legislation brought procedure closer to continental models. J. Chorus 
states: ‘In England … the new forms of process, as laid down in the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 
1875 and in the Rules of Court which came to supplement these Acts, must be regarded as the 
triumph of chancery, and thus the triumph of civilian ideas.’43 How did this change come about? 
Unfortunately, not all details concerning the drafting of the Judicature Acts have been explored. 
We do not know completely, for example, to what extent foreign examples (including those from 
Scotland) were used as a source of inspiration. Nevertheless, it seems likely that developments 
across the Atlantic played a role, since some of the more important innovations introduced by the 
Judicature Acts in English procedural law had several decades before been incorporated in the 
Code of Procedure for the State of New York. Surprisingly enough, until now references to this 
so-called Field Code (after its main drafter) have only been found very sparingly in sources 
related to the drafting of the Judicature Acts.44 
 The Code of Procedure of New York was one of several codes drafted by David Dudley 
Field (1805-1894), who dominated the American codification scene for a considerable part of the 
19th century.45 The Code of Procedure was one of the few codes which were actually enacted. 
This happened in 1848. The new procedure for New York combined elements of the forms of 
action at common law and the procedure in equity, the emphasis being, at least according to 
some authors, on the latter procedure.46 The Field Code shows a marked influence of the 
Romano-canonical procedure. This might have been the result of two factors: (1) the fact that 
Field used equity as a source for his new procedure; and (2) the fact that some New York rules of 
procedure were related to procedural rules enacted in the State of Louisiana, a civil law 
jurisdiction (additionally, the drafters of the Field Code occasionally refer to Scotland). The 1825 
Louisiana Code of Procedure was, according to D. Clark, probably the most important vehicle 
for Field’s ideas about the codification and content of civil procedure. This code was based on 
French, Spanish, and Roman civil law sources as well as the common law tradition. The Corpus 
Iuris, the Siete Partidas, and the writings of Jean Domat (1625-1696) and Robert Pothier (1699-
1772) were, for example, consulted when drafting this piece of legislation.47 If it can be shown 
that the procedural rules of the Judicature Acts have been influenced by the Field Code and, 
consequently, by the Romano-canonical procedure - either directly or through some intermediate 
stage (possibly the procedural legislation for British India, dating form the 1850’s)48 - this would 
                                                             
42. R. Stürner, Das Europäischen Zivilprozessrecht - Einheit oder Vielfalt?, in: Wege zu einem europäischen 
Zivilprozessrecht. Tübinger Symposium zum 80. Geburtstag von Fritz Baur, Tübingen n.d., 23. 
43. Chorus, Civilian Elements, 296. 
44. J. Jacob, The Judicature Acts 1873-1875, Vision and Reality, in: The Reform of Civil Procedural Law and Other 
Essays in Civil Procedure, London 1982, 315-316. 
45. On Field, see H.M. Field, The Life of David Dudley Field, New York 1898; A. Reppy (ed.), David Dudley Field 
Centenary Essays. Celebrating One Hundred Years of Legal Reform , New York 1949. 
46. Cf. A. Reppy, The Field Codification Concept, 49ff. An author who does not agree with this point of view is S.N. 
Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, Law and 
History Review 1988, 337: ‘They [i.e. Field and the other Code commissioners] used the merger of law and equity as 
much as an occasion for conforming equity to common-law procedure as the reverse’; ibidem, 338: ‘It was more 
obvious to those closer to David Dudley Field’s times that this Code was confining and formalistic and that Field was 
deeply tied to common-law procedural thought.’ 
47. Clark, The Civil Law Influence, 74. 
48. I consulted The New Procedure of the Civil Courts of British India, 4th edition, London 1860. 
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be an extra argument for the thesis that the gap between continental Europe and England is not as 
wide as is usually thought. Further research into this topic is very much needed. 
 
4 Common elements of civil procedure in Europe  
The developments described above justify the conclusion that procedural law is not as national a 
subject as has long been held. Similarities between the national procedures can often be 
explained on the basis of contacts with foreign legal systems. I will discuss some of these 
similarities below. In doing so I will focus on similarities between the Continent and England. 
First I will discuss the 19th century and afterwards I will deal with an important example of 
convergence in the 20th century. 
 
4.1 Shared elements of civil procedure in 19th century Europe  
According to T. Plucknett, one of the most significant themes in the study of legal history is the 
growth of the power to think of law apart from its procedure.49 This development is already 
apparent from Roman Law, although even at a late stage in its development procedure was 
discussed as an integral part of substantive law: the Corpus Iuris Civilis does not separate 
procedural issues from substantive law. The definition of procedure as a separate field of study is 
due to the medieval students of the Roman and Canon Laws (even though it must be admitted 
that elements of substantive law continued to play a significant role in procedural treatises).50 In 
England, however, the separation of substantive and procedural law occurred much later in 
history. Although first traces of attempts to describe substantive law apart from procedure may 
be found in the medieval treatises of Glanvill and Bracton, the first serious attempts to separate 
substantive law from procedure seem to date from the 18th century. Inspiration for doing so 
came, according to Plucknett, from abroad. In the 18th century English lawyers took an interest 
in French and Dutch works, and ‘under this stimulus they attempted to think in terms of 
substantive law rather than merely of procedure.’ Blackstone’s Commentaries are a good 
example of this attempt. However, only the reforms of the 19th century made it possible to 
effectively separate substantive law from procedure51 (these reforms seem to have followed the 
example of the American Field Code in this respect). Currently we find both in England and on 
the Continent separate textbooks dealing with procedure. Additionally, courses solely 
concentrating on the law of procedure are a feature of many European law faculties. 
 A similar tendency of convergence can be witnessed in the area of forms of action 
available for bringing a lawsuit. At a certain point in time, the Roman Law possessed a more or 
less closed system of actions. Only where the complaint could be brought under one of the 
available formulae granted by the Roman praetor could a lawsuit be started. The writ system of 
the English common law resulted in a similar situation.52 However, things changed. As a result, 
the Romano-canonical procedure, as well as the continental European systems derived from it, 
only know a single, general action for bringing a lawsuit. The same development occurred in 
England as a result of the Judicature Acts. The forms of action were abolished. In their place a 
single, general action was created. It is not unlikely that this development was the result of civil 
law influences through the example of the 1848 Code of Procedure for the State of New York 
(Field Code): the Field Code was the first piece of legislation to mandate a single form of action 
in a common law jurisdiction. As in Louisiana, this action was called the ‘civil action.’53 
 The concept ‘cause of action’ is possibly another element in the Judicature Acts that has 
been influenced by continental legal thinking, possibly through the Field Code. According to 
                                                             
49. Plucknett, A Concise History, 381. 
50. See e.g. Ph. Wielant, Practijke civile. 
51. Plucknett, A Concise History, 381-382. 
52. On this issue, see Pringsheim, The Inner Relationship between English and Roman Law, Cambridge Law Journal 
1935, 347. 
53. Field Code §§ 1 and 4. Cf. Clark, The Civil Law Influence, 79 and 82. 
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Stephen Subrin, ‘Field and the others [i.e. the other members of the codification commission] 
used the term ‘cause of action’ to try to describe those groupings of facts to which legal 
consequences attach.’ He further mentions: ‘‘Cause of action’ was their way of describing a right 
of citizens that could be enforced in court.’54 Section 142 of the Field Code specifically mentions 
the ‘cause of action’ where it states that ‘[t]he complaint shall contain [...] [a] statement of the 
facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in 
such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended [...].’ 
According to Clark, the concept of ‘cause of action’ can be traced back through the Louisiana 
Code of Practice (Article 172; there it is rendered in French as ‘les motifs de l’action’ and ‘la 
cause de l’action’) to the French Code of Civil Procedure.55 However, further investigation into 
this matter is needed since other authors claim that ‘cause of action’ is a concept which can 
already be found in English 15th century legal sources, and it is not clear whether its definition in 
English legal practice (as opposed to its definition in the Field Code) is related to the civil law.56 
 Pleading is also an interesting subject for those interested in a possible convergence of 
civil procedural law, even though at first glance pleading is, of course, a very technical area 
which sets the common law apart from continental jurisdictions. According to Holdsworth, 
however, pleading in the Judicature Acts owed something to the system in use in the Court of 
Admiralty.57 This court had a procedure based on the Romano-canonical model.58 Additionally, 
the Romano-canonical model might have influenced the new rules of pleading through the 
American Field Code which, in its turn, might have influenced the Judicature Acts. It seems that 
for his rules on pleading (which put an emphasis on pleading facts, i.e. ‘fact-pleading’ or ‘code-
pleading’)59 Field drew primarily on the Romano-canonical system as illustrated by French and 
Spanish law.60 He permitted only four types of pleadings: the complaint, answer, reply, and 
demurrer (§ 156). A reply was only allowed when an answer contained new matter (§ 153). As a 
result, in most suits in which the defendant raised no affirmative defence, the pleading stage 
could be completed in two or maybe three (with a demurrer to make dilatory objections) steps.61 
 Particularly interesting from the ‘convergence perspective’ are counterclaims. 
Counterclaims were not allowed at common law. Only the relief for which the suit had been 
instituted could be granted. Since counterclaims are brought in pending lawsuits, they can by 
their very definition never be the relief for which the suit is instituted. On the Continent the 
Romano-canonical procedure and the systems based on it allowed counterclaims (under the 1806 
Code of civil procedure in France such claims were also allowed, even though they were not 
mentioned as such; see currently the new Code de Procédure Civile, Article 64).62 The 
Judicature Acts made counterclaims generally available in England. Holdsworth claims that this 
change was based on a rule of practice prevailing in the ecclesiastical courts (the 1848 Field 
Code did not contain provisions on counterclaims; in 1852, however, a provision was 
included).63 This rule allowed the court to give the relief to which the parties were entitled 
though the suit had been instituted for a different kind of relief.64 Since the procedure of the 
ecclesiastical courts is of Romano-canonical origin, the rise of counterclaims in English 
procedure is possibly another illustration of civil law influence on the British Isles. 
                                                             
54. Subrin, David Dudley Field, 329.  
55. Clark, The Civil Law Influence, 82-83. 
56. C.E. Clark, The Code Cause of Action, Yale Law Review 1923-1924, 820ff. 
57. Holdsworth, A History XV, 134. See also ibidem XII, 684. 
58. Chorus, Civilian Elements, 296. 
59. Fact-pleading also became a feature of English civil procedure. See Glenn, La civilisation, 573: ‘Certaines 
institutions de la procédure civile s’alignent aussi sur le modèle civiliste. On ne plaide plus, en principe, le droit …’ 
60. Clark, The Civil Law Influence, 76. 
61. Clark, The Civil Law Influence, 83. 
62. On counterclaims in continental jurisdictions, see my ‘De vordering in reconventie in Nederland en Europa’, 227ff. 
63. Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 823;  Subrin, David Dudley Field, 332. 
64. Holdsworth, A History XV, 135. See also ibidem XII, 684-685. 
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 A last example of convergence in the 19th century is the appeal. Originally, the common 
law did not know a system of appeal, i.e. a means of recourse by way of rehearing a case in a 
higher court. Without a hierarchy of courts, which originally did not exist in England, such a 
system of recourse is not feasible.65 English lawyers got acquainted with the appeal system 
through the Romano-canonical procedure of the ecclesiastical courts. This system was copied in 
England, at least in externals.66 Later, the Judicature Acts introduced a system of appeals which 
might have been derived from the Field Code, which in its turn might have been based on the 
Louisiana Code. At the same time, these Acts, like the Field Code (§ 323), abolished the writ of 
error of the common law, a means of recourse which aimed at reviewing questions of law (error 
in the proceedings) which appeared on the record of the court below.67 Under the new procedure, 
an appeal could also be lodged in cases where formerly the writ of error had been available.68 
 
4.2 Convergence of civil procedure in the 20th century 
Reforms of civil procedure in the 20th century have been the cause of convergence of the rules 
of procedural law in many European countries. In the present paper I would like to discuss only 
one example of convergence, albeit a very important one: the importance of the judge in the 
conduct of civil litigation in England and the Continent. 
 Traditionally, both the systems inspired by the Romano-canonical procedure and the 
forms of action at common law aim at avoiding arbitrary decisions. They seek to guarantee that 
judicial decisions are based on the truth (be it the formal or the substantive truth). In order to 
reach this goal, they assign to the judge and the parties a fixed role in the proceedings. Both 
systems have, to a certain extent, an adversarial character,69 even though some present-day 
common law lawyers are inclined to describe continental civil procedures as inquisitorial.70 The 
adversarial character of the procedures both on the Continent and in England appears from the 
fact that in England as well as on the Continent the principle of party presentation 
(Verhandlungsmaxime) applies.71 The principle prescribes that the scope and the content of the 
judicial controversy are to be defined by the parties or, conversely, that the court is restricted to a 
consideration of what the parties have put before it.72 In addition, the principle of ‘party control 
over the subject matter’ (Dispositionsmaxime) is a feature of both continental and English civil 
procedure. This means that the aggrieved party decides whether or not a lawsuit will be started, 
that the defendant decides whether or not he will introduce his defense, and that each party takes 
the sundry procedural steps.73 As a result, the judge is relatively passive, even though it cannot 
be denied that judges have some power to take initiatives in the conduct of the proceedings 
without any demand by parties or counsel to do so.74 Nevertheless, in the end, it is the parties 
who dominate the litigation, not the judge. 
                                                             
65. Van Caenegem, History, 30: ‘The Common Law knew nothing of an appeal, i.e., a rehearing of a case [...] (the term 
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 Undue delays in the proceedings and high costs have, however, resulted in measures 
increasing the directive powers of the judge. Of course, these measures are not as extreme as 
those introduced in 18th century Prussia under Frederick the Great, which resulted in a procedure 
that could rightly be called inquisitorial.75 Nevertheless, there has been a slow movement into the 
direction of a more active role for the judge. This is especially true for England. Although the 
Judicature Acts did not seriously affect the principle of ‘party presentation,’ they gave the court 
slightly larger powers to regulate the course of the procedure.76 Unfortunately, they did not solve 
the existing problems since English procedure remained expensive and cumbersome. However, 
the recent reforms of civil procedure in England will most likely be more successful. The basis 
of these reforms were two reports by Lord Woolf entitled Access to Justice77 in which the 
negative aspects of the English adversarial system were pointed out.78 The main characteristics 
of the reforms are an increase in the directive powers of the judge and the emphasis on a cultural 
move towards court control of litigation practices. It should be the courts, and not the parties, 
who determine the pace of the litigation process and its intensity.79 The adversarial principle, 
which was so dominant a feature of English civil procedure, is therefore under attack.80 
Consequently, we may conclude that also in this area of procedure convergence between 
England and the Continent is taking place. 
 
Summary 
Interaction between the various systems of procedure in Europe has been taking place for at 
least 800 years. In this respect, the reception of the Romano-canonical procedure in secular 
courts and the changes brought about by the English Judicature Acts and by Lord Woolf are 
crucial. The convergence of procedure resulting from this interaction makes it likely that the 
approximation of judiciary law in the European Union is a feasible option. In my opinion 
initiatives aiming at harmonisation may benefit from paying attention to the rich history of 
procedure. I am convinced that knowledge of the history of procedure will smooth the path 
for those who feel that a fragmented Europe in the field of procedural law distorts the proper 
functioning of the internal market and is undesirable.81 
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